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Hong-LinYu
In relation to international commercial arbitration, the exclusion of
arbitration from the scope of application of the new Regulation (EU) No.
1215/2012, of the European Parliament and the Council of 12 December
2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters (hereinafter the Regulation), in Article
1(2)(d) re-defines the litigation tactics for this popular method of dispute
resolution dealing with cross-border disputes, especially in terms of
anti-suit injunctions. This provision is in consonance with the European
Court’s West Tankers decision,1 which not only forces English courts to
stop their over-zealous willingness to grant an anti-suit injunction across
borders but also has sent the issue of anti-suit injunction back to the
battle-field.
An anti-suit injunction is an application to the court in favour of a
valid arbitration agreement between the parties to issue an injunction
restraining a party from proceeding with foreign court proceedings. This
is frequently used as litigation tactics in commercial litigations world-
wide. Such practice has seen the Indian court’s refusal to issue an
injunction to stop ICC (International Chamber of Commerce) arbitration
proceedings in Renusagar v General Electric2 and the French court’s
non-interference attitude in terms of arbitration proceedings in Guuinee
Equatoriale v Fitzpatrick3, as well as the infamous West Tankers, which
was followed by the recast of the Brussels I Regulation.
1 Case C-185/07 Allianz v West Tankers [2009] ECR I-663.
2 Rensugar Power Co Ltd (India) v General Electric Company (US) and
the International Chamber of Commerce (France), Supreme Court (India) 16
August 1984, Yearbook of Commercial Arbitration, 431.
3 République de Guinée Equatoriale v Fitzpatrick Equtorial, Tribunal de
Grande Instance, Paris, 29 March (2010) Les Cahiers de l’Arbitrage 521. Also
see Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, ‘Turning The Tanker: Anti-Suit And Anti-
Arbitration Injunctions – Injunctions And Anti-Injunctions’, (2013) 79(1) Arbi-
tration 12, 13.
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In cases involving an arbitration agreement or arbitration itself, an
anti-suit injunction is viewed as a defence shield to force the unwilling
party back to the arbitration table. Among the European jurisdictions,
England, attempting to establish itself as an arbitration friendly country,
was renowned to be one of the jurisdictions which were happy to allow
such an application providing that a valid arbitration agreement existed
between the disputants. Consequently, an application for an anti-suit
injunction involving arbitration agreements in English courts was
regarded as a magic wand that ran the errand of all aspects of the
jurisdiction issue until West Tankers, followed by the revised Brussels I
Regulation in 2012. Suffering from the double blows of the European
Court decision on West Tankers and the arbitration exemption in the
revised Regulation in 2012, the English courts have been forced to
re-think the issue arising from the application of anti-suit injunctions.
While the magic wand waves its way through the European jurisdictions,
it seems to send Prince Arbitration back to the frog it once was.
The purpose of this chapter is to present the background which
prompted the changes in anti-suit injunction application and examine
whether the Commission’s trust in the current New York Convention
framework is well placed when it decides to exclude arbitration from the
scope of the application of the Regulation. The author will also examine
the assumptions made by the Commission under the existing arbitration
legal framework and questions whether the exclusion offers parties with
confidence and certainty in their decision to arbitrate. Furthermore, the
international practice will be examined to ascertain whether the principle
of mutual trust and the New York Convention do provide the parties with
a final efficient and conclusive decision, which is supposedly recognised
or enforced by the signatory countries of the Convention on the Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958 (hereinafter the
New York Convention).4
4 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series
(UNTS), vol.330, p. 3.
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BEFORE THE RECAST OF THE REGULATION –
ENGLISH COURTS SEEN AS THE GUARDIAN OF
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
To maintain the popularity of London as the place of international
commercial arbitration, the English courts always showed their willing-
ness to grant anti-suit injunctions to applicants who wished to prevent
any foreign proceedings taking place in breach of a valid arbitration
agreement between the parties. As Millet LJ once said, the English Court
did not need to feel any diffidence in granting an injunction to restrain a
party from proceeding in a foreign court in breach of an arbitration
agreement governed by English law as long as the foreign proceedings
were not too far advanced.5 Thus the English courts were happy to
support the applicant’s intention to pursue dispute resolution through
arbitration. In consonance with Millett LJ, Cresswell J was of the opinion
that injunctions should be granted if the applicant could demonstrate to
the court that an injunction would be an effective remedy in vexatious or
oppressive foreign proceedings.6 He stated:
The principles relevant to applications for an anti-suit injunction in cases
where there is an arbitration agreement governed by English law can be stated
as follows: …
An injunction will only be issued restraining a party who is amenable to the
jurisdiction of the Court, against whom an injunction will be an effective
remedy. Since such an order indirectly affects the foreign Court, the juris-
diction is one which must be exercised with caution. The Court will, generally
speaking, only restrain a party from pursuing proceedings in a foreign Court
if such pursuit would be vexatious or oppressive. If contracting parties agree
to give a particular court or arbitral tribunal exclusive jurisdiction to rule on
claims between those parties, and a claim falling within the scope of the
agreement is made in proceedings in a forum other than that which the parties
have agreed, the Court will ordinarily exercise its discretion … to secure
compliance with the contractual bargain, unless the party suing in the
non-contractual forum … can show strong reasons for suing in that forum.7
5 The Angelic Grace [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 87, 96 (Millett LJ).
6 American International Specialty Lines Insurance Co. v Abbott Labor-
atories [2002] EWHC 2714 (Comm),
7 Ibid., 274 (Cresswell J).
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Although the English Court has been seen as a willing jurisdiction to
issue anti-suit injunctions, caution is said to be essential when issuing
such injunctions. Citing National Westminster Bank v Utrecht-America
Finance Company,8 it was pointed out by Cresswell J that
It would be inappropriate to grant an interlocutory injunction to restrain
foreign proceedings at a time when it is no more than arguable that they were
brought in breach of contract, because it could not be said that such
proceedings were vexatious or oppressive. … [T]he applicant must show to a
high degree of probability that its case is right, and that it is entitled as of
right to restrain the foreign proceedings.9
The same practice was also applied in British Airways Board v Laker
Airways Ltd., where the English Court of Appeal was undeterred by the
extraterritorial effects of US antitrust law between the United States and
England, and granted the four defendants to a case lodged with the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia10 an anti-suit
injunction to restrain Laker Airways from pursuing its antitrust action in
the US court.11 Although this injunction was later reversed by the House
of Lords12 on the grounds of public policy, the reversal made by the
House of Lords itself also received negative criticisms for its lack of clear
guidance to provide adequate safeguards against the future issuance of a
similar injunction.13
In Through Transport Mutual Insurance Association (Eurasia) Ltd v
New India Assurance Association Co Ltd., Clarke LJ was of the view
that, regardless of whether the dispute is ancillary to, or an integral part
of, the arbitration process,14 the arbitration exemption stipulated in
Article 1(2)(d) of Council Regulation 44/2001 on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
8 National Westminster Bank v Utrecht-America Finance Company [2001]
EWCA Civ 658.
9 Note 6 above, per Cresswell J, 275.
10 Laker Airways Ltd. v Pan American World Airways, 559 F. Supp. 1124.
11 British Airways Board v Laker Airways Ltd. [1984] 1 1 Q.B. 142.
12 Note 11 above.
13 Robert Cannon, ‘Laker Airways and the Courts: A New Method of
Blocking the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Laws’, (1985) 7
Journal of Comparative Business and Capital Market Law 63, 78.
14 Through Transport Mutual Insurance Association (Eurasia) Ltd v New
India Assurance Association Co Ltd. [2004] EWCA Civ 1598.
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Matters would apply to anti-suit injunction cases and was not subject to
the first seised principle in Articles 27 and 28;15 consequently,
[the] question in each case is whether the (or a) principal focus of the
proceedings is arbitration. That test seems to us to be consistent … . Another
way of putting the same point is to ask the question … whether the essential
subject matter of the claim concerns arbitration … [or] whether the relief
sought in the action can be said to be ancillary to, or perhaps an integral part
of the arbitration process. In our opinion the decisions that … both the claim
for a declaration that there was a binding arbitration agreement between the
parties and the claim for an anti-suit injunction within the arbitration
exception were correct.”16
However, such willingness was not shared in a series of EU cases.
REVIEW OF THE ENGLISH PRACTICE BY THE
EUROPEAN COURT
The different conclusions reached by a series of EU cases, such as Marc Rich
v Impianti (The Atlantic Emperor),17the Gasser case,18 Turner v Grovit,19
15 Article 27:
1. Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the
same parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court
other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its proceedings
until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established.
2. Where the jurisdiction of the court first seised is established, any court
other than the court first seised shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that
court.
Article 28:
1. Where related actions are pending in the courts of different Member
States, any court other than the court first seised may stay its proceedings.
2. … For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be related where
they are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine
them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from
separate proceedings.
16 Note 14 [47–48].
17 Case C-190/89 Marc Rich v Impianti [1991] ECR I-3855.
18 Case C-116/02 Erich Gasser LmbH v MISAT Srl [2003] ECR I-14693.
19 Case C-159/02 Gregory Paul Turner v Felix Fareed Ismail Grovit [2005]
ECR I-3565 (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the House of Lords,
Opinion of Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer AG, Reference for a preliminary ruling from
the House of Lords); [2005] 1 A.C. 101.
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Van Uden Maritime v Deco-Line20 and West Tankers21 led the English courts
to review policy on granting anti-suit injunctions and eventually stopped the
practice. The issues considered by the European Court include that the
substance of the dispute determines the scope of application of the Regu-
lation in Marc Rich, mutual trust among European jurisdiction must prevail
in Gasser and Turner, provisional measures arising from arbitration are not
ancillary but parallel matters in Van Uden Maritime and, finally, no interfer-
ence of other European court proceedings in West Tankers. All these issues
laid down the foundation of the recast of the Regulation, and will be
examined in turn.
Marc Rich v Impianti22 (The Atlantic Emperor)23 – Substance of
Dispute will Decide
On 31 May 1989, the English Court of Appeal referred to the European
Court for a preliminary ruling between Marc Rich and Scoietá Itaiana
Impianti P.A., parties to an arbitration agreement. Earlier, in 1988, Marc
Rich had sought assistance from the English High Court for an appoint-
ment of arbitrators on behalf of Impianti. Impianti requested that the
order granting leave be set aside due to the invalidity of the arbitration
agreement. While Impianti argued for the exclusion of proceedings for
the appointment of an arbitrator from the scope of the Convention, Marc
Rich and the UK Government asked for a wider interpretation on the
arbitration exclusion under Article 1(2)(d) of the Convention. To facilitate
the Union-wide recognition and enforcement of court judgments, in the
European Court of Justice’s (ECJ’s) own words, it does not follow that
the Convention, whose purpose is in particular the reciprocal recognition
and enforcement of judicial decisions, must necessarily have attributed to
it a wide field application.24 The European Court affirmed that the
subject matter of the dispute will determine the scope of application in
terms of the Convention. It stated:
In order to determine whether a dispute falls within the scope of the
Convention, reference must be made solely to the subject-matter of the
dispute. If, by virtue of its subject-matter, such as the appointment of an
20 Case C-391/95 Van Uden Maritime BV, trading as Van Uden Africa Line
v Kommanditgesellschaft in Firma Deco-Line [1998] ECR I-7091.
21 Case C-185/07 Allianz v West Tankers [2009] ECR I-663.
22 See note 17, para.18.
23 The Atlantic Emperor [1992] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 624.
24 See note 17, para. 16.
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arbitrator, a dispute falls outside the scope of the Convention, the existence of
a preliminary issue which the court must resolve in order to determine the
dispute cannot, whatever that issue may be, justify application of the
Convention.25
Contrary to Clarke LJ’s decision in Through Transport Mutual Insurance
Association (Eurasia) Ltd v New India Assurance Association Co Ltd.,
the ECJ highlighted the importance of the nature of subject matter, which
would determine whether the subject matter would fall into the scope of
the Regulation. It was determined that the scope of application of the
Regulation can only be determined by the subject matter of the dispute
alone. As long as the subject matter falls within its scope of application,
the Regulation applies, not only to the main dispute, but also to ancillary
or preliminary issues. The European Court was of the opinion that:
It follows that, in the case before the Court, the fact that a preliminary issue
relates to the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement does not affect
the exclusion from the scope of the Convention of a dispute concerning the
appointment of an arbitrator. Consequently, the reply must be that the
Convention must be interpreted as meaning that the exclusion provided for
therein extends to litigation pending before a national court concerning the
appointment of an arbitrator, even if the existence or validity of an arbitration
agreement is a preliminary issue in that litigation.26
The Gasser Case27 and Turner v Grovit28 – Ideology of Mutual Trust
among the National Courts of Member States
Gasser and Turner are the two judgments delivered by the European
Court to re-confirm the ideology of mutual trust as the unshakable pillar
among the European jurisdictions. In Gasser, a dispute arose between
Gasser, an Austrian children’s clothing seller, and an Italian buyer,
MISAT. On 19 April 2000 MISAT brought proceedings against Gasser
before the Italian Tribunale Civile e Penale (Civil and Criminal District
Court) di Roma seeking a ruling that the contract between them had
terminated ipso jure or, in the alternative, that the contract had been
terminated following a disagreement between the two companies. On 4
December 2000 Gasser brought an action against MISAT before an
Austrian court to obtain payment of outstanding invoices. In support of
25 See note 17, para. 26.
26 See note 17, paras 28–29.
27 See note 18 above.
28 See note 19.
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the jurisdiction of that court, the claimant submitted that it was not only
the court for the place of performance of the contract, within the meaning
of Article 5(1) of the Convention, but was also the court designated by a
choice-of-court clause. Although confirming its own jurisdiction as the
court of the place of performance, the Austrian court decided to stay its
proceedings29 until the jurisdiction of the Italian court had been estab-
lished. Gasser appealed, complaining, among other things, of the ineffi-
ciency of the Italian court system. Consequently, the issue was referred to
the European Court.
One of the issues the European Court was asked to determine was
whether a court other than the court first seised within the meaning of the
first paragraph of Article 21 of the Brussels Convention may review the
jurisdiction of the court first seised if the second court has exclusive
jurisdiction pursuant to an agreement conferring jurisdiction under Art-
icle 17 of the Brussels Convention, or whether it must wait until the
second court proceeds in accordance with Article 21 of the Brussels
Convention notwithstanding the agreement conferring jurisdiction. The
European Court ruled that the court subsequently seised must apply the
normal rules on concurrent proceedings, which prevent it from reviewing
the jurisdiction of the court first seised, even where there is alleged to be
an agreement conferring jurisdiction on the court subsequently seised. It
stated:
The Commission states that the Brussels Convention is based on mutual trust
and on the equivalence of the courts of the Contracting States and establishes
a binding system of jurisdiction which all the courts within the purview of the
Convention are required to observe. The Contracting States can therefore be
obliged to ensure mutual recognition and enforcement of judgments by means
of simple procedures. This compulsory system of jurisdiction is at the same
time conducive to legal certainty since, by virtue of the rules of the Brussels
Convention, the parties and the courts can properly and easily determine
international jurisdiction. Within this system, Section 8 of Title II of the
Convention is designed to prevent conflicts of jurisdiction and conflicting
decisions.30
Therefore, all the courts within the purview of the Brussels I Regulation
are required to respect the compulsory system of jurisdiction based on
mutual trust. The Member States would waive their right to apply their
internal rules on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments but in
favour of a simplified mechanism for the recognition and enforcement of
29 Pursuant to Article 21 of the Brussels Convention.
30 See note 18, para. 67.
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judgments. Consequently, the Convention will be able to ensure legal
certainty by allowing individuals to foresee with sufficient certainty
which court will have jurisdiction.31 In short, the Italian court had to be
trusted to determine whether it would decline jurisdiction and such
jurisdiction was not derogated until it decided to stay its proceedings or
declined its proceedings.32
The same view was expressed in the Turner case, where one sees the
English practice of awarding anti-suit injunctions take a further serious
blow. Apart from applying subject matter criteria in determining the
scope of application, the importance of Turner v Grovit is that the ECJ
re-asserted the essential nature of the principle of mutual trust within the
European Union. It was highlighted that mutual trust between EU
jurisdictions shall see national courts restraining themselves from inter-
fering with foreign court proceedings in another Member State.
An unfair dismissal claim under an employment contract between Mr.
Turner, a British national, and Mr. Grovit, Harada Limited (UK) and
Changepoint SA (Spain) was brought to an employment tribunal in the
English court and the Spanish court. In March 1998, Mr. Turner initiated
an unfair dismissal claim against Harada Ltd. in an employment tribunal
in London. The tribunal confirmed its jurisdiction and awarded damages
in Mr. Turner’s favour. However, in July 1998, Mr. Turner was sued by
Changepoint in the Spanish court (Madrid). Mr. Turner refused to accept
the summons issued by the Spanish court and protested the jurisdiction of
the Spanish court. Later, Mr. Turner asked the English High Court to
issue an injunction based on Section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act
1981, backed by a penalty restraining Mr. Grovit, Harada and Change-
point from pursuing the proceedings commenced in Spain. An inter-
locutory injunction was issued by the High Court but was later refused
for its extension. On appeal by Mr. Turner, the Court of Appeal issued an
injunction ordering the defendants not to continue the proceedings
commenced in Spain and to refrain from commencing further proceed-
ings in Spain or elsewhere against Mr. Turner in respect of his contract of
employment on the ground of bad faith. On appeal, the House of Lords
was asked whether the English courts have the power to make restraining
orders preventing the continuation of proceedings in foreign jurisdictions
covered by the Regulation. The House of Lords sought clarification from
the European Court to decide whether the national courts of a Member
State have the power to award an anti-suit injunction to prohibit a party
31 See note 18, para. 72.
32 Also see Mauro Rubino-Sammartano, note 3, 15.
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from participating in foreign court proceedings when that party is acting
in bad faith.
Three main issues – the importance of mutual trust, undesirable
interference of foreign jurisdiction and potential abusive litigation tactics
– were examined by the European Court in order to determine whether
the English courts had the jurisdiction to award Mr. Turner an anti-suit
injunction to prohibit other parties from participating in foreign court
proceedings as well as to restrain the Spanish court from exercising its
jurisdiction over the disputes submitted to it.
The judgments showed that the European Court was absolutely clear
and took an uncompromising stand on the issue of mutual trust. Follow-
ing Gasser, the European Court was of the opinion that mutual trust as
the pillar of the Brussels I Regulation cannot be shaken in any way.
Upholding the ideology of mutual trust, the European Court dismissed
the possibility of anti-suit injunctions and effectively told the English
courts that they have to trust the Spanish courts to determine on the
issues of bad faith and jurisdiction, respect the jurisdiction of the Spanish
courts, recognise the need for an independence of the proceedings in
Spain, and eventually to decline jurisdiction and concede to the English
employment tribunal.33 It stated:
[O]ne of the pillars of the Brussels Convention is the reciprocal trust
established between the various national legal systems, upon which the
English restraining orders would seem to cast doubt. That view seems to me
to be decisive. European judicial co-operation, in which the Convention
represents an important landmark, is imbued with the concept of mutual trust,
which presupposes that each state recognises the capacity of the other legal
systems to contribute independently, but harmoniously, to attainment of the
stated objectives of integration. No superior authorities have been created to
exercise control, beyond the interpretative role accorded to the Court of
Justice; still less has authority been given to the authorities of a particular
State to arrogate to themselves the power to resolve the difficulties which the
European initiative itself seeks to deal with. It would be contrary to that spirit
for a judicial authority in member states to be able, even if only indirectly, to
have an impact on the jurisdiction of the court of another contracting state to
hear a given case. …
It is difficult to accept that a state which issues an injunction of this kind
could unilaterally attribute to the jurisdiction which it is protecting an
33 S. Wolff, ‘Tanking Arbitration or Breaking the System to Fix It?’, (2009)
15 Columbia Journal of European Law, 65, 66, http://www.cjel.net/online/15_2-
wolff-2/. Accessed 14 August 2013.
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exclusive character. If all European courts arrogated such a power to
themselves, chaos would ensue.34
Clearly, the English courts’ attempt to interfere with the Spanish courts’
jurisdiction was seen as an unwelcome move, as such a step would
damage the ideology of mutual trust within the European Union. The
European Court in Turner was of the opinion that mutual trust lays down
the foundation to a successful compulsory system of jurisdiction estab-
lished by the Brussels I Regulation for the Member States. This principle
has to be respected by all relevant national courts with the purview of the
Brussels I Regulation. Under the Regulation framework, those national
courts are to waive the right to apply their domestic law on recognition
and enforcement of foreign judgments in favour of a simplified mechan-
ism for the recognition and enforcement of judgments made by the
national courts of other Member States.35 Such a mutual trust, coming
with the waiver, will guarantee the European-wide recognition and
enforcement of the judgments made by all courts across the Union.
In relation to the issue of interference of foreign jurisdiction, the
European Court expressed a strong negative view on the English practice
and stated that the request for an anti-suit injunction restraining the
Spanish courts from exercising jurisdiction over the dispute between the
parties amounted to a serious interference in foreign court proceedings.
The Spanish court’s jurisdiction to determine the issues would be
seriously undermined by such an injunction issued by the English courts.
Consequently, the Spanish court would effectively be deprived of its
jurisdiction to deal with the dispute by the issuance of the anti-suit
injunction. The European Court also rejected the English court’s argu-
ment on the difference between an order in personam addressed to a
litigant and one which is addressed to a foreign court. Believing that
these two orders aim to reach the same result and in view of the lack of
clear distinction between them, the European Court stated that plaintiff’s
right to action is essential for a court to hear a case. If the plaintiff is
deprived of the right to do so under an anti-suit injunction issued by a
foreign court, the result is unwanted interference with the jurisdiction of
the judge as he is not permitted to hear or decide the case.36 Such
interference with and deprivation of the jurisdiction of the foreign court
is incompatible with the ideology of the Regulation.37
34 Note 19 [30–33].
35 Note 19 [24]. Also see Case C-116/02 Gasser [2003] ECR I-14693, [72].
36 Note 19 [34].
37 Note 19 [27].
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Being unwillingly dragged into a foreign jurisdiction to deal with the
same dispute as the one being dealt with by the employment tribunal,
understandably Mr. Turner and the UK Government raised the argument
of possibility of abuse of process by Grovit and Changepoint in the
Spanish court. They further pointed out that granting an anti-suit injunc-
tion is a measure to protect the victim of abuse of process who is at the
receiving end of unscrupulous behaviour in the form of a vexatious or an
oppressive proceeding, regardless of the place of jurisdiction.38 Con-
sequently, they said that the principles of mutual trust and non-
interference must give way to the protection of the victim in such abuse.
The European Court refused to accept such a view. Waving the flag of
mutual trust, the European Court even pointed out that such argument
‘runs counter to the principle of mutual trust which … underpins the
Regulation and prohibits a court, except in special circumstances which
are not applicable in this case, from reviewing the jurisdiction of the
court of another Member State’.39 Furthermore, the UK’s argument that
the granting of an anti-suit injunction would contribute to the attainment
of the objective of the Regulation by minimising the risk of conflicting
decisions and multiplicity of proceedings was also rejected by the
European Court. It held:
First, recourse to such measures renders ineffective the specific mechanisms
provided for by the Convention for cases of lis alibi pendens and of related
actions. Second, it is liable to give rise to situations involving conflicts for
which the Convention contains no rules. The possibility cannot be excluded
that, even if an injunction had been issued in one Contracting State, a decision
might nevertheless be given by a court of another Contracting State. Similarly,
the possibility cannot be excluded that the courts of two Contracting States
that allowed such measures might issue contradictory injunctions.40
Gasser and Turner clearly held that the principle of mutual trust among
the jurisdictions of the European Member States is of paramount
consideration of the European Court. This principle cannot be under-
mined in any way. Consequently, parties’ intention to use arbitration to
resolve dispute must give way to mutual trust, even at the cost of
multiple civil proceedings.
38 Note 19 [15].
39 Note 19 [28].
40 Note 19 [30].
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Van Uden Maritime v Deco-Line41 – Provisional Measures Arising
out of Arbitration are not Ancillary but Parallel Matters
A similar line of reasoning on the subject matter decided in Marc Rich
can also be seen in Van Uden Maritime v Deco-Line, which upheld that
interlocutory orders are not ancillary to arbitration proceedings but are
ordered in parallel to arbitration proceedings.42 The logic behind the
decision leads to two different proceedings. The first type is arbitration
proceedings which fall outside the scope of the Regulation by virtue of
Article 1(2)(d) of Brussels I. The second type is court proceedings
dealing with interlocutory orders which fall within the scope of the
Regulation. This analogy can be seen in the European Court’s answer to
the question whether a Dutch court has jurisdiction to hear a case
involving an interlocutory order against a German party who was a party
to an arbitration agreement. The European Court first stated that any
matters which are excluded from the scope of Brussels I cannot rely on
Article 35 (ex 31) to resolve the issue of jurisdiction.43 Later the
European Court famously found that though arbitration in its entirety is
excluded from the scope of the Regulation, the parallel nature of
interlocutory order proceedings to arbitration allowed the Dutch court to
exercise jurisdiction to decide whether it is appropriate to offer inter-
locutory orders. In this case, Van Uden and the Commission were of the
viewpoint that the subject matter of the dispute is decisive and that the
issue underlying the interim proceedings concerns the performance of a
contractual obligation – a matter which falls within the scope of the
Brussels I Regulation.44 The Court held that the mere fact that proceed-
ings have been, or may be, commenced on the substance of a case before
a court of a contracting state does not deprive a court of another
contracting state of its jurisdiction under Article 35 (ex 31) of the
Brussels I Regulation.45 That is why Article 35 (ex 31) of the Convention
applies even if a court of another Member State has jurisdiction as to the
substance of the case, provided that the subject matter of the dispute falls
within the scope ratione materiae of the Brussels I Regulation.
41 Note 20.
42 Note 20.
43 Note 20 [30]; Case 143/78 De Cavel v De Cavel [1979] ECR 1055 [9].
44 Note 20 [27].
45 Note 20 [29].
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Agreeing with Schlosser’s report,46 the European Court pointed out
that Brussels I47 does not apply to issues concerning the validity of
arbitration agreements, the revocation, amendment, recognition or
enforcement of arbitral awards, or any proceedings which are ancillary to
arbitration proceedings.48 However, referring to Reichert and Kockler v
Dresdner Bank,49 the Court stated that the interlocutory order concerned
not arbitration as such but the protection of a wide variety of rights which
are intended to be covered by the Convention. In other words, the Court
can invoke Article 31 in support of arbitration proceedings as ‘these
measures are not ancillary to the arbitration but rather stand-alone and
parallel to such arbitration. They are therefore not excluded from the
Convention.”’50 The Court explained:
[I]t must be noted in that regard that provisional measures are not in principle
ancillary to arbitration proceedings but are ordered in parallel to such
proceedings and are intended as measures of support. They concern not
arbitration as such but the protection of a wide variety of rights.51 Their place
in the scope of the Convention is thus determined not by their own nature but
by the nature of the rights which they serve to protect.52
Bringing provisional measures into the scope of the Convention, the
Court stated that:
It must therefore be concluded that where, as in the case in the main
proceedings, the subject-matter of an application for provisional measures
relates to a question falling within the scope ratione materiae of the
Convention, the Convention is applicable and Article 24 thereof may confer
46 P. Schlosser, ‘Report on the Convention on the Association of the
Kingdom of Denmark and others to the Convention on jurisdiction and the
enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters and to the Protocol on
its interpretation by the Court of Justice’, [1979] OJ C59/71.
47 Now the Regulation.
48 Note 46 [92–93]. Also, see Andreas Estrup Ippolito and Morten Adler-
Nissen, ‘West Tankers Revisited: Has The New Brussels I Regulation Brought
Anti-Suit Injunctions Back Into The Procedural Armoury?’, (2013) 79(2) Arbi-
tration 158, 160.
49 Case C-261/90 Reichert and Kockler v Dresdner Bank [1992] ECR
I-2149 [32].
50 C. Van Calster, ‘Kerpow! The United Kingdom Courts, West Tankers, and
the Arbitration “Exception” in the Brussels I Regulation’, (2013) 21(1) European
Review of Private Law 205.
51 Note 20 [33].
52 Ibid. Also see Case C-261/90 Reichert and Kockler v Dresdner Bank
[1992] ECR I-2149 [32].
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jurisdiction on the court hearing that application even where proceedings have
already been, or may be, commenced on the substance of the case and even
where those proceedings are to be conducted before arbitrators.53
West Tankers – No Interference with Judicial Proceedings Elsewhere
in Europe54
In this case, a ship chartered by West Tankers collided with a jetty in
Syracuse, an Italian port, and caused damage to it. The owner of the jetty,
Erg Petroli, was also the owner of the ship. The governing law of the
charterparty was English law and a London arbitration clause was
incorporated. After obtaining partial damages in the form of compen-
sation for the damage to the jetty from its insurers, Allianz and Generali,
Erg Petroli brought arbitration proceedings against West Tankers in
London for the balance. At the same time, Allianz and Generali brought
tortious claims against West Tankers in the Italian court based on
subrogation arising from the indemnity from the compensation to Erg
Petroli. West Tankers responded with the argument that the Italian courts
could not hear the claim because it was covered by the arbitration clause,
as well as bringing proceedings in England for a declaration that its
dispute against Allianz and Generali was covered by the arbitration
clause. Consequently, an anti-suit injunction against Allianz and Generali
was requested by West Tankers with regard to the Italian proceedings.
Both the declaration and the injunction were later granted by the English
courts. Allianz and Generali appealed to the House of Lords on the
ground that the grant of the injunction was contrary to the first seised
principle under the Brussels I Regulation (Regulation 44/2001). West
Tankers argued that the Regulation did not apply because arbitration is
excluded from its scope by means of Article 1(2)(d). Later, the House of
Lords referred the case to the European Court for guidance after failing
to find an answer to the question whether a court of a Member State
could issue anti-suit injunctions in support of arbitration agreements from
the precedents. While seeking clarification on the provision, the House of
Lords also expressed their opinions to give wider interpretation of the
exclusion of Regulation in following the words:
The proceedings now before the House are entirely to protect the contractual
right to have the dispute determined by arbitration. Accordingly, they fall
outside the Regulation and cannot be inconsistent with its provisions. The
53 Note 20 [34].
54 Case C-185/07 Allianz v West Tankers [2009] ECR I-663.
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arbitration agreement lies outside the system of allocation of court juris-
dictions which the Regulation creates. There is no dispute that, under the
Regulation, the Tribunale di Siracusa has jurisdiction to try the delictual
claim. But the arbitration clause is an agreement not to invoke that juris-
diction and it is that agreement which the order of Colman J requires to be
performed. As Professor Dr Peter Schlosser points out in an illuminating
article (Anti-suit injunctions zur Unterstützung von Internationalen Schieds-
verfahren (2006) RIW 486–492), an exclusive jurisdiction clause is in this
respect quite different. It takes effect within the Regulation under article 23
and its enforcement must therefore be in accordance with the terms of the
Regulation; in particular, article 21. But an arbitration clause takes effect
outside the Regulation and its enforcement is not subject to its terms.55
However, such a view was not taken by the European Court. The
ideology of mutual trust established in Gasser and Turner supports the
ECJ’s belief in West Tankers that the court of a Member State shall have
the power to rule on its own jurisdiction under the Regulation; therefore
any attempt to issue an anti-suit injunction by national courts of other
Member States, the English court in this case, would be deemed
inconsistent with the purpose of the Regulation.56 Following the reason-
ing applied in Marc Rich, the European Court took the view that any
preliminary issues associated with the main subject matter of the dispute
would fall into the scope of the Regulation. It stated:
[T]he Court finds, as noted by the Advocate General in points 53 and 54 of
her Opinion, that, if, because of the subject-matter of the dispute, that is, the
nature of the rights to be protected in proceedings, such as a claim for
damages, those proceedings come within the scope of Regulation No 44/2001,
a preliminary issue concerning the applicability of an arbitration agreement,
including in particular its validity, also comes within its scope of appli-
cation.57
The European Court repeated the line held by Van Uden that the
Regulation applies to any preliminary issues associated with the main
subject matter of the dispute. Furthermore, the Court stressed that the
scope of Regulation 44/2001 will be decided solely by the subject matter
of the proceedings,58 and the subject matter is determined by the nature
of the rights which the proceedings in question serve to protect.59 In this
55 [2007] UKHL 4 [14].
56 Note 54 [32].
57 Note 54 [26].
58 Note 18 [26].
59 Note 54 [22]; see also Van Uden [33].
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case, it is the right of a foreign court to determine its own jurisdiction. In
contrast the proceedings leading to the making of an anti-suit injunction
do not fall into the scope of the Regulation.60 With the preliminary issues
falling into the scope of the Regulation, national courts of Member States
will not be subject to the first seised principle incorporated in the
Regulation. Instead they are to determine the issue of their own juris-
dictions on the disputes which are meant to be resolved by arbitration.
Such a restrictive interpretation of Article 1(2)(d) of the Regulation is not
only in consonance with the precedents but also is said to be in
compliance with the European Court’s restrictive agenda on anti-suit
injunctions.61
To sum up, the application for an anti-suit injunction with the effect of
denying the Italian court to assert jurisdiction under Article 5(3) is
contrary to the general principle which emerges from the case-law of the
European Court on the Brussels I Regulation. Every court should have
the power to determine whether it has jurisdiction to resolve the dispute
before it, as
[i]t should be borne in mind in that regard that Regulation No 44/2001, apart
from a few limited exceptions which are not relevant to the main proceedings,
does not authorise the jurisdiction of a court of a Member State to be
reviewed by a court in another Member State. … That jurisdiction is
determined directly by the rules laid down by that regulation, including those
relating to its scope of application. Thus in no case is a court of one Member
State in a better position to determine whether the court of another Member
State has jurisdiction.62
Moreover, the Court expressly pointed out that ‘such an anti-suit injunc-
tion also runs counter to the trust which the Member States accord to one
another’s legal systems and judicial institutions and on which the system
of jurisdiction under Regulation No 44/2001 is based’.63
The West Tankers decision told the English courts that they do not have
the power to issue an anti-suit injunction to interfere with the jurisdiction
of other Member States. Instead of being told by the English courts what
to do or what not to do, foreign courts shall be left alone to determine
their own jurisdiction. The English courts are minded that they have to
respect the principle of mutual trust and believe that the courts of other
60 Note 54 [23].
61 Note 50, 212.
62 Note 54 [29].
63 Ibid. [30].
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Member States can and will make the correct decision in terms of their
jurisdiction or the lack of it over the disputes.
POST WEST TANKERS – FROM THE PROPOSAL TO
THE FINAL VERSION OF THE REGULATION
In accordance with the principle of lis pendens, Article 29 of the revised
version of the Brussels I Regulation64 stipulates that, without prejudice to
the cases where the defendant enters an appearance in court under Article
26(1) or of exclusive jurisdiction agreements under Article 31(2),65 where
proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same
parties are brought in the courts of different Member States, any court
other than the court first seised shall of its own motion stay its
proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court seised is
established. The revised lis pendens rule set out in Articles 29–34 (ex
27–30) of the Regulation is designed to deal to some extent with
so-called ‘torpedo action’66 within the European jurisdictions, which
enabled a natural defendant to utilise the first-seise approach to prevent
the natural plaintiff from initiating the dispute in an appropriate forum,
by means of an earlier filing by the natural defendant in another country
of a request for a judgment declaratory of non-liability.
However, despite the debates concerning the exclusion of arbitration in
EC Regulation 44/2001 from the case-law, the Commission decided to go
ahead with the recast of the Regulation. The background to the recast is
said to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings, to avoid
abusive litigation tactics and maintain mutual trust. Recitals 21, 22, 26
and 27 of Regulation No 1215/2012 highlight such objectives:
64 Regulation (EU) No 1215/2012 on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, [2012] OJ L351/1.
65 Article 31(2) provides the legal basis for the exception of exclusive
jurisdiction which reads: ‘Without prejudice to Article 26, where a court of a
Member State on which an agreement as referred to in Article 25 confers
exclusive jurisdiction is seised, any courts of another Member State shall stay the
proceedings until such time as the court seised on the basis of the agreement
declares that it has no jurisdiction under the agreement.’
66 M. Franzosi, ‘Worldwide Patent Litigation and the Italian Torpedo’,
[1997] 7 EIPR 382.
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1. To minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings – Recital 21
In the interests of the harmonious administration of justice it is
necessary to minimise the possibility of concurrent proceedings and
to ensure that irreconcilable judgments will not be given in different
Member States. There should be a clear and effective mechanism
for resolving cases of lis pendens and related actions, and for
obviating problems flowing from national differences as to the
determination of the time when a case is regarded as pending. For
the purposes of this Regulation, that time should be defined
autonomously.67
2. Avoid abusive litigation tactics – Recital 22
However, in order to enhance the effectiveness of exclusive choice-
of-court agreements and to avoid abusive litigation tactics, it is
necessary to provide for an exception to the general lis pendens rule
in order to deal satisfactorily with a particular situation in which
concurrent proceedings may arise. This is the situation where a
court not designated in an exclusive choice-of-court agreement has
been seised of proceedings and the designated court is seised
subsequently of proceedings involving the same cause of action and
between the same parties. In such a case, the court first seised
should be required to stay its proceedings as soon as the designated
court has been seised and until such time as the latter court declares
that it has no jurisdiction under the exclusive choice-of-court
agreement. This is to ensure that, in such a situation, the designated
court has priority to decide on the validity of the agreement and on
the extent to which the agreement applies to the dispute pending
before it. The designated court should be able to proceed irrespec-
tive of whether the non-designated court has already decided on the
stay of proceedings. This exception should not cover situations
where the parties have entered into conflicting exclusive choice-of-
court agreements or where a court designated in an exclusive
choice-of-court agreement has been seised first. In such cases, the
general lis pendens rule of this Regulation should apply.68
3. Mutual trust – Recitals 26 and 27
Mutual trust in the administration of justice in the Union justifies
the principle that judgments given in a Member State should be
67 Recital 21 of EU Regulation 1215/2012 on jurisdiction and the recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters (recast),
[2012] OJ L351/1. The copyright of the European Union in the text and recitals
of the Regulation is hereby acknowledged.
68 Note 67, Recital 22.
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recognised in all Member States without the need for any special
procedure. In addition, the aim of making cross-border litigation
less time-consuming and costly justifies the abolition of the declar-
ation of enforceability prior to enforcement in the Member State
addressed. As a result, a judgment given by the courts of a Member
State should be treated as if it had been given in the Member State
addressed.69 For the purposes of the free circulation of judgments, a
judgment given in a Member State should be recognised and
enforced in another Member State even if it is given against a
person not domiciled in a Member State.70
Before these three principles were written in stone in the revised Brussels
I Regulation as adopted, a rather different solution was envisaged in the
EU Commission’s Proposal, under which the parties’ intention to use
arbitration to resolve their disputes was recognised and given full effect
in the proposed Recital 20. It was proposed to have special provisions
designed to avoid abusive tactic parallel proceedings aiming to compro-
mise arbitration proceedings, and further allow improvement of the
effectiveness of arbitration agreements.71 Hence, a flexible mechanism
was proposed to allow the courts in the Member States to take into
account proceedings pending before the courts of non-contracting states,
and in particular the proper administration of justice and whether or not
any non-contracting state judgment is capable of recognition and enforce-
ment in that Member State.72 Based on such a view, a very different
version of proposed Article 29(4) containing the principle of lis pendens
saw a call for the courts of Member States to stay court proceedings
when the parties argue for the validity of arbitration agreements. It reads:
69 Note 67, Recital 26.
70 Note 67, Recital 27.
71 Proposed Recital 20, [16] of the Proposal for a Regulation to the
Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and the
Council on Jurisdiction and Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters (Recast) of 14.12.2010 (COM(2010) 748 final); Recital
20 reads: ‘The effectiveness of arbitration agreements should also be improved in
order to give full effect to the will of the parties. This should be the case, in
particular, where the agreed or designated seat of arbitration is in a Member
State. This Regulation should therefore contain special rules aimed at avoiding
parallel proceedings and abusive litigation tactics in those circumstances. The
seat of the arbitration should (p. 16) refer to the seat selected by the parties or the
seat designated by an arbitral tribunal, by an arbitral institution or by any other
authority directly or indirectly chosen by the parties.’
72 Proposed Recital 21.
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Where the agreed or designated seat of an arbitration is in a Member State,
the courts of another Member State whose jurisdiction is contested on the
basis of an arbitration agreement shall stay proceedings once the courts of the
Member State where the seat of the arbitration is located or the arbitral
tribunal have been seised of proceedings to determine, as their main object or
as an incidental question, the existence, validity or effects of that arbitration
agreement.
This paragraph does not prevent the court whose jurisdiction is contested
from declining jurisdiction in the situation referred to above if its national law
so prescribes. Where the existence, validity or effects of the arbitration
agreement are established, the court seised shall decline jurisdiction.
This paragraph does not apply in disputes concerning matters referred to in
Sections 3, 4, and 5 of Chapter II.73
The effort to include arbitration in the scope of application of the
Regulation could find its origin in the Commission’s proposal, which
reads:
The interface between arbitration and litigation needs to be improved.
Arbitration is excluded from the scope of the Regulation. However, by
challenging an arbitration agreement before a court, a party may effectively
undermine the arbitration agreement and create a situation of inefficient
parallel court proceedings which may lead to irreconcilable resolutions of the
dispute. This leads to additional costs and delays, undermines the predictabil-
ity of dispute resolution and creates incentives for abusive litigation tactics.74
The proposal also evoked coordination between courts of Member States
when dealing with anti-suit injunctions. It suggests:
Concerning provisional, including protective measures, the proposal provides
for the free circulation of those measures which have been granted by a court
having jurisdiction on the substance of the case, including – subject to certain
conditions – of measures which have been granted ex parte. By contrast, the
proposal prevents the circulation of provisional measures ordered by a court
other than the one having jurisdiction on the substance. Given the wide
divergence of national law on this issue, the effect of these measures should
be limited to the territory of the Member State where they were granted,
thereby preventing the risk of abusive forum-shopping. Finally, if proceedings
on the substance are pending in one court and another one is asked to issue a
73 Proposed Article 29(4).
74 Proposal for a Regulation to the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and the Council on Jurisdiction and Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast) of
14.12.2010 (COM(2010) 748 final). Section 1, p. 4.
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provisional measure, the proposal requires the two courts to cooperate in
order to ensure that all circumstances of the case are taken into account when
a provisional measure is granted.75
Efforts were also made to eliminate the possibility of parallel proceed-
ings between the competing European jurisdictions as well as between
arbitration and European court proceedings. This is evident in the
interaction between the earlier proposed Recitals 11 and 20. The pro-
posed Recital 11 maintained the same position as the EU case-law which
excludes the application of arbitration in terms of the form, existence,
validity or effects of arbitration agreements, the powers of the arbitrators,
the procedure before arbitral tribunals, and the validity, annulment,
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards.
In December 2012, the final version of the Regulation not only
maintained the arbitration exemption but also removed the proposed
Article 29(4), Recitals 20 and 21. Its failure to address the concerns over
parallel proceedings between arbitration and court proceedings will
disappoint most arbitration practitioners and academics who have been
searching for a way to avoid conflicting decisions or indeed parallel
proceedings.76 In its final version, the European Commission took the
same standing as the European Court by expressly excluding arbitration
from its scope of application in accordance with Article 1(2)(d). Con-
vinced that the New York Convention77 and other international agree-
ments are sufficient to deal with the issues arising from arbitration,
Article 1 of the Regulation stipulates: (1) This Regulation shall apply in
civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal.
It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative
matters. (2) The Regulation shall not apply to: … (d) arbitration.’
Although the Regulation may serve well in dealing with competing
European court proceedings, by the same token the Commission’s
decision in not extending these provisions to arbitration is rather dis-
appointing.
From this provision it is clear that the decisions and the opinions
delivered by the English Supreme Court in West Tankers no longer
75 Note 74, Section 3.1.5, p. 9.
76 David Holloway, ‘Avoiding Duplicative Litigation about Arbitration
Awards within the EU’, (2011) 9(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement
435.
77 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, New York, 10 June 1958, United Nations Treaty Series
(UNTS), vol.330, p. 3.
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stands. Consequently, the concerns raised in the proposal – such as
increased additional costs and delay, undermining of the predictability of
dispute resolution, the creation of incentives for abusive litigation tactics,
the potential circulation of provisional measures ordered by a court, and
the possibility of parallel proceedings between competing court juris-
dictions as well as between arbitration and courts – fell behind the
principle of mutual trust in the Regulation.
THE FINAL VERSION OF THE REGULATION –
ARTICLE I(2)(D) AND RECITAL 12
With an outright exception written in Article 1(2)(d), which leaves the
definition of scope of arbitration undefined, Recital 12 is seen as an effort
to provide clarification on the concise arbitration exception. Recital 12
reads:
This Regulation should not apply to arbitration. Nothing in this Regulation
should prevent the courts of a Member State, when seised of an action in a
matter in respect of which the parties have entered into an arbitration
agreement, from referring the parties to arbitration, from staying or dismissing
the proceedings, or from examining whether the arbitration agreement is null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, in accordance with
their national law.
A ruling given by a court of a Member State as to whether or not an
arbitration agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
performed should not be subject to the rules of recognition and enforcement
laid down in this Regulation, regardless of whether the court decided on this
as a principal issue or as an incidental question.
On the other hand, where a court of a Member State, exercising jurisdiction
under this Regulation or under national law, has determined that an arbitration
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed, this
should not preclude that court’s judgment on the substance of the matter from
being recognized or, as the case may be, enforced in accordance with this
Regulation. This should be without prejudice to the competence of the courts
of Member States to decide on the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards in accordance with the Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment for Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at New York on 10 June 1958 (‘the
1958 New York Convention’), which takes precedence over this Regulation.
This Regulation should not apply to any action or ancillary proceedings
relating to, in particular, the establishment of an arbitral tribunal, the powers
of arbitrators, the conduct of arbitration procedure or any other aspects of
such a procedure, nor to any action or judgment concerning the annulment,
review, appeal, recognition or enforcement of an arbitral award.
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What Recital 12(1) does is to set out the scope of arbitration exception
stipulated in Article 1(2)(d) of the Regulation. The scope of exception
ranges from referring the parties to arbitration and staying or dismissing
the proceedings, to examining whether the arbitration agreement is null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed. In short, nothing
in the Regulation would prevent the national courts of the Member States
from applying their own national laws to determine the above issues.
Linking Recital 12(1) with the Commission’s restatement about avoiding
undermining the New York Convention, this paragraph intends to uphold
the signatory countries’ obligation to recognise the validity of a written
arbitration agreement under Article II(1) of the New York Convention and
the consequential legal effects of a valid arbitration agreement under
Article II(3) of the same Convention. Accordingly, the courts of the
Member States may exercise their jurisdiction to refer the parties to
arbitration; in the case where the disputes are submitted to national
courts, the courts may decide whether to stay or simply dismiss the court
proceedings until the parties’ disputes are resolved by arbitration.
The long awaited hope of avoiding parallel proceedings between court
litigation and arbitration is dashed as the second part of the paragraph
gives the Member State courts the go-ahead and the freedom to examine
the validity of arbitration agreements. The issue is further complicated by
the lack of priority order between the courts seised of the matter.78 For
instance, the words ‘the court of a Member State’ seem to suggest that a
party can still initiate court proceedings in any national court of a
Member State, either the place of arbitration or a state different from the
seat of arbitration, to examine the validity of arbitration agreements.
Suppose arbitration is to take place in Member State A: the issue of the
validity of the arbitration agreement can be raised in a court of Member
State A; the party may request this court to affirm the validity of the
arbitration agreement and refer the parties to arbitration. However, with
the nature of international commerce it is very likely that the other party
may already have initiated foreign court proceedings in a different
Member State or Member States outside of the place of arbitration in
order to declare the arbitration agreement null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed, in accordance with its national law, in
order to force the claimant to abandon arbitration through the recognition
and enforcement of court judgments under the Regulation. The effect of
78 Andreas Estrup Ippolito and Morten Adler-Nissen, ‘West Tankers
Revisited: Has the New Brussels I Regulation Brought Anti-Suit Injunctions
Back Into the Procedural Armoury?’, (2013) 79(2) Arbitration 158, 167.
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this paragraph is that an unwilling party to arbitration can still apply
abusive litigation tactics to stall arbitration proceedings at the place of
arbitration by requesting a foreign court to determine the validity of the
arbitration clause.
Undesirable results are further compounded by the West Tankers
decision, where the court of place of arbitration was specifically told by
the European Court that it did not have the power to issue an anti-suit
injunction to interfere with foreign court proceedings on the same issue,
that is, validity of arbitration. This would lead to further delay and costs,
as with the complaints made by the claimants in Gasser and West Tankers
in relation to the concerns over the inefficiency of the Italian courts.
Although the tribunal has the power to determine its jurisdiction in
relation to the validity of an arbitration agreement and carry on with
arbitration with or without the affirmation given by the courts of the
place of arbitration, the award can potentially still be challenged at a later
stage if the arbitration agreement is declared null and void, inoperative or
incapable of being performed by the court of place of arbitration or a
foreign court. For a court system which is efficient, the parties may not
have to wait too long to hear the decision. However, such an award will
be subject to a long period of uncertainty due to inefficient court
proceedings, as raised by West Tankers and the English Supreme Court in
West Tankers. Therefore, the questions one has to ask are whether it is
fair to place a party in such a position when speed and certainty are the
main reasons why one decides to avoid the court system in the first place,
and whether it is a good idea to reduce arbitration to such muddled-up
legal accidents without a coordinated and articulated sense of direction.
To avoid the different interpretations of the Anglo-Saxon and Contin-
ental European debates on the relationship between anti-suit injunctions
and the main disputes discussed in West Tankers, the second paragraph of
Recital 12 states that, regardless of whether the validity of arbitration
agreements forms the main issue or is an ancillary issue to be decided by
the courts of a Member State, any such decisions do not fall into the
scope of the Regulation and shall be subject to the national principles of
res judicata, and issue estoppel.79 This is also stated in paragraph 4 of
Recital 12, which excludes any ancillary proceedings from its appli-
cation.
Interestingly, this view does not apply to the preliminary issues
between the parties, where the European Court held that preliminary
issues parallel to arbitration would be subject to the scope of the Brussels
79 Note 78, 167.
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I Regulation, and any decisions made by the courts of a Member State
would be binding on the courts of other Member States. The consequence
of this view is that the parties are given the go ahead by the Recital to
revert back to the practice of parallel proceedings which would see a
party who is keen to resolve disputes by means of arbitration being
dragged through unwanted court proceedings screaming to defend their
wish to resolve disputes by arbitration.
Furthermore, this exercise of jurisdiction dealing with disputes by the
courts will not prevent the courts of other Member States from recognis-
ing or enforcing the arbitral awards under its prioritised obligation under
the New York Convention. The non-interference with the New York
Convention can also be noted in the last part of paragraph 4 of Recital
12, which excludes any recognition, enforcement, annulment or review of
the arbitral awards from its application and leaves such matters to be
decided under Articles V(1)(e) and VII of the New York Convention.
Unfortunately, due to the wording used in these two provisions, such
matters are left to the discretion of the relevant courts of the Member
States.
THE DISCRETION OF THE COURTS OF THE MEMBER
STATES
The main aims of the revised Brussels I Regulation are to promote the
mutual trust of the national courts of the Member States and to ensure
the Union-wide recognition and enforcement of any judgments made by
the courts of any Member State. The Regulation may achieve such goals
in terms of court judgments now; however the exclusion of arbitral
awards and other important issues related to the validity of the arbitration
agreements or awards from the application of the Regulation means that
the predictability of arbitration is placed on a rather unstable basis.
Consequently, the validity of arbitration agreements or awards is to be
decided by the different interpretations of national laws and every court
of the Member States will have a say on the important issues which go to
the heart of an award, regardless of whether the court is the first seised or
second seised court. This leads to a very high risk of parallel proceedings
and conflicting judgments and awards on the same issues. It will create
the typical nightmare scenario which appeared in Dallah Real Estate,80
80 [2010] UKSC 46. In this case, an award in favour of Dallah Real Estate
was given by the arbitral tribunal. Actions over tribunal jurisdiction were raised
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which was not the first and will not be the last case to be experienced. In
fact, the introduction of Article 1(2)(d) and Recital 12 can only eliminate
the possibility of torpedo action if (1) the court of the seat of arbitration
decides to refer the parties to arbitration proceedings; (2) the same issues
have been raised by the unwilling party in the domestic and foreign court
proceedings; and, most importantly, (3) the judgment of the court of the
seat of arbitration is delivered before the foreign courts. Without meeting
any of these three conditions, Article 1(2)(d) and Recital 12 would fail to
prevent a party from being dragged into an unplanned and unwanted
court battle-field just to reiterate his intent to arbitrate. A further
complication that needs to be addressed is whether the court of the seat
of arbitration has to accept a negative decision delivered by a foreign
court earlier than its own. This is totally undesirable, as Hodges and
Shore pointed out:
Even if the court of the seat of arbitration referred the parties to arbitration,
the prospects of answering the case across jurisdictions to defend his right to
arbitrate would be a daunting task and unnecessary burden on the parties.
Although it is said that the court of the seat of arbitration is not required to be
bound by the decision declaring the invalidity of arbitration agreement by the
foreign courts, before the judgment on the preliminary issues is delivered by
the court of the seat of arbitration, potential conflicting EU court judgments
and arbitral award may not be avoidable, both of which may be presented to
an enforcing court for enforcement.81
in the French courts and the English courts. Holding different views on
the principle of ‘group of company’ which was used to determine whether the
Pakistani Government was a party subject to the tribunal’s jurisdiction, the
French courts and the English courts came to different conclusions. The French
court viewed the Pakistani Government and the Trust which signed the arbitra-
tion agreement as one group; consequently the Government subjected itself to the
arbitration agreement. In contrast, the English courts viewed them as different
entities and decided that the Pakistani Government was not a party to the
arbitration agreement.
81 Paula Hodges and Laurence Shore, The Revised Brussels Regulation: Are
We Back To Where We Started?, Herbert Smith Freehills Arbitration Notes;
http://hsf-arbitrationnotes.com/2012/12/12/the-revised-brussels-regulation-are-we-
back-to-where-we-started/. Accessed 14 August 2013.
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THE ASSUMPTION OF THE EU COMMISSION ON THE
MUST-FOLLOW DOCTRINE OF MUTUAL TRUST
It has been pointed out that the English courts have given the arbitration
exemption a broad interpretation which includes primary and secondary
disputes connected with an arbitration agreement manifesting the parties’
intention to resolve disputes by means of arbitration.82 In contrast, the
European approach is said to be more restrictive and the scope of the
exemption will depend on the nature of the substantive subject matter of
the main disputes. If the type of dispute falls within the scope of the
Regulation, a court of the Member State is entitled to exercise juris-
diction and examine whether arbitration exemption applies. This
approach can be seen clearly in the opinion expressed by Advocate
General Kokott83 and the West Tankers case examined above.84
The different interpretation of the arbitration exception in relation to
anti-suit injunctions given by the English courts and the European Court
represents the different approaches taken by the Anglo-Saxon and
Continental jurists. For the Anglo-Saxon jurists, a wider interpretation
including all related matters arising from arbitration proceedings is a
more logical thinking to define the arbitration exception as they believe
that the exception shall include arbitration in its entirety, including the
issue of jurisdiction.85 This can be seen in Gasser, where the United
Kingdom Government and Gasser relied on the Overseas Union Insur-
ance and Others86 and argued that in no case is the court second seised in
a better position than the court first seised to determine whether the latter
has jurisdiction.87 Furthermore, considering avoiding the risk of irrecon-
cilable judgments, the UK Government proposed that the Court should
hold that a court first seised whose jurisdiction is contested in reliance on
an agreement conferring jurisdiction must stay proceedings until the
court which is designated by that agreement, and which is the court
second seised, is given the opportunity to decide on its own jurisdiction.88
82 Note 46, [61]. Also see, Andreas Estrup Ippolito and Morten Adler-
Nissen, note 79 above, 158.
83 Opinion of Kokott AG (9 September 2008), [44].
84 Case C-185/07 Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA and Generali Assi-
curazioni Generali SpA v West Tankers Inc.
85 Note 18 [18]. See also see note 50, 207.
86 Case C-351/89 Overseas Union Insurance and Others [1991] ECR
I-3317.
87 Note 86 [23].
88 Note 86 [33].
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In contrast, relying on the combination of the judgments outlining
‘subject matters decide’ in Marc Rich and ‘provisional measures as
parallel proceedings’ in Van Uden, the Continental European jurists drew
a clear line between arbitration proceedings and related court proceed-
ings. Consequently, as one can see, the two sides met at the battle-ground
of the West Tankers, and the recast of the Regulation. Trumpeting the
principle of mutual trust as the basis of the success of the Brussels I
Regulation and the Union, from the wording of Article 1(2)(d) and
Recital 12, the Continental approach, with the support of the Commis-
sion, has won the battle for now and forced the English court to adjust its
position on this issue.89
The Regulation may have reaffirmed the doctrine of mutual trust and
provided the courts of Member States a clear guidance on the issue of
competing jurisdictions in the court system. As stated by Lord Hobhouse
in Turner, ‘it is not the purpose of the Convention to require uniformity
but to have clear rules governing jurisdiction’.90 However, the combin-
ation of ‘subject matters dictates the scope of application’ and the
principle of mutual trust, along with West Tankers, will definitely see a
rise in the possibility of parallel proceedings and irreconcilability
between judgments and arbitral awards. The European Court’s decision
in West Tankers literally ended the English practice, allowing the
possibility of torpedo actions, which are viewed as unwelcome, and the
results are likely to frustrate the reputation of arbitration as a swift
dispute resolution mechanism. Both the Regulation and the precedents
also sent out an alarming message to academics and practitioners in the
field of international private law and arbitration about the come-back of
parallel proceedings.
The risk arising from such a possibility is especially high for the party
who wishes to manage the dispute resolution within an agreed period of
time. Instead he is left with delay and extra costs to battle with the other
litigant in a court or courts of the Member States. Most undesirably, the
party is forced to take part in foreign court proceedings, despite intending
to avoid such a situation when the parties entered into an arbitration
agreement. The principle of mutual trust may also see an unwilling party
sit nervously waiting for delayed court judgments which may be in
89 Ben Steinbruck, ‘The Impact of EU Law on Anti-Suit Injunctions in aid
of English Arbitration Proceedings’, (2007) 25 Civil Justice Quarterly 358;
Christa Roodt, ‘Conflicts of Procedure between Courts and Arbitral Tribunals
with Particular Reference to the Right of Access to Court’, (2011) African
Journal of International and Comparative Law 236.
90 Turner v Grovit [2001] UKHL 65 [37].
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conflict with the award made by the tribunal or the judgments delivered
by the court of the seat of arbitration. Furthermore, it is very likely that
the existence of parallel proceedings in dealing with the preliminary
issues could see the party faced with conflicting decisions on the same
substantive issue arising out of those parallel proceedings, leading to
further complications at the enforcement stage.
THE EU COMMISSION’S ASSUMPTION ON THE
SATISFACTORY FRAMEWORK UNDER THE NEW
YORK CONVENTION
Apart from the must-follow principle of mutual trust, the Commission
also places its trust in the ‘satisfactory framework’ established by the
New York Convention. The Commission maintains that the combination
of Articles I, V and VII of the New York Convention will be able to
ensure the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards among all
signatory countries. In its proposal the Commission acknowledges that
‘In any event, most stakeholders expressed general satisfaction with the
operation of the 1958 New York Convention which should not be
undermined by any Union action on the matter.’91 A question which
remains worthy of examination is whether New York Convention is
indeed sufficient to eliminate parallel proceedings and to ensure consist-
ent judgments. More importantly, the New York Convention and inter-
national agreements have to answer the question of whether mutual trust
exists between national courts as well as between arbitration and national
courts.
The assumptions behind the promulgation of arbitration exemption
under Article 1(2)(d) are said to be the Commission’s contentment with
the existing arbitration legal framework, including the New York Conven-
tion and other international agreements. The Commission is of the
opinion that the interaction between national arbitration laws and the
international legal framework is sufficient to deal with the parties’
intention to arbitrate and obtain certainty in final arbitral awards. Such
contentment can be seen in Marc Rich,92 where the European Court was
explicit that the New York Convention itself includes a number of
91 Proposal for a Regulation to the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and the Council on Jurisdiction and Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast) of
14.12.2010 (COM(2010) 748 final). Section 2, p. 5.
92 Note 17 [18].
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obligations for the courts of the Member States and such Convention
obligations would provide certainty in arbitral awards. Moreover, by
virtue of its subject matter, such as the appointment of an arbitrator, any
dispute falling outside the scope of the Regulation or the existence of a
preliminary issue which the court must resolve in order to determine the
dispute, cannot justify application of the Regulation.93
The Commission’s contentment with the New York Convention can be
traced back to Marc Rich, where the European Court pointed out that:
There are already many international agreements on arbitration. Arbitration is,
of course, referred to in Article 220 of the Treaty of Rome. Moreover, the
Council of Europe has prepared a European Convention providing a uniform
law on arbitration, and this will probably be accompanied by a Protocol
which will facilitate the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards to an
even greater extent than the New York Convention. This is why it seemed
preferable to exclude arbitration.94
Also,
The international agreements, and in particular the abovementioned New York
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, … , lay down rules which must be respected not by the arbitrators
themselves but by the courts of the Contracting States. Those rules relate, for
example, to agreements whereby parties refer a dispute to arbitration and the
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. It follows that, by excluding
arbitration from the scope of the Convention on the ground that it was already
covered by international conventions, the Contracting Parties intended to
exclude arbitration in its entirety, including proceedings brought before
national courts.95
It is open to question whether the New York Convention is indeed
sufficient to provide certainty in the finality of arbitral awards. While
Article I of the New York Convention requires all signatory countries to
recognise and enforce arbitral awards ‘made in the territory of a State
other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such
awards are sought, and arising out of differences between persons,
whether physical or legal’,96 past research and the reading of Article V
have shown that the national courts of the signatory countries are also left
with a high level of discretion in deciding whether a convention award
93 Note 17 [12].
94 Note 17 [17].
95 Note 17 [18].
96 Article I(1) of New York Convention 1958.
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can be recognised or enforced in its jurisdiction. This can be seen in the
wordings ‘under the law to which the parties have subjected to’, ‘under
the law of the country where the award was made’97 and ‘was not in
accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took
place’,98 as well as the inarbitrability exception99 or public policy100 of
the country where the recognition or enforcement is sought. Placing
much of its trust in the New York Convention and enforcement mechan-
ism set up in Article III of the New York Convention, one can only guess
that the Commission assumption was founded upon the parties’ voluntary
performance of the award and non-interference of the awards by the
relevant courts. However, what the Commission ignored is un-
cooperative parties and the discretion enjoyed by the national courts. The
issue of un-cooperative parties could lead to parallel proceedings between
arbitration and courts and see the parties debating the tribunal jurisdiction
at the same time as arbitration is taking place. Too much reliance on
Article I and the failure to address the issue of discretion in Article V, as
well as hoping Article VII allows the enforcing court discretion to
enforce the award despite a successful challenge to the award being made
in the countries where arbitration took place, will see inconsistent
judgments on matters arising from arbitration.
Common sense tells us that the tribunal’s award may not in reality
automatically lead to the finality of an arbitral award. Its finality depends
on the decisions of the enforcement court or, in some cases, the court of
the place of arbitration. This can be seen in the grounds listed in Article
V of the New York Convention. Article V(1)(e) allows the court of the
seat of arbitration to set aside an award with a consequence of non-
recognition and non-enforcement of the award at the enforcing court.
Article V also allows the enforcing court, either on the losing party’s
application under Article V(1) or on its own initiative under Article V(2),
to decide on the finality of the award.
While the so-called ‘final’ award delivered by the tribunal has to wait
for the final stamp of the enforcing court before its finality can be
established, what the arbitration exclusion in the Regulation does is to
throw arbitration back to the situation of competing jurisdiction between
the tribunal, the enforcing courts, the court of the place of arbitration and
any other relevant court. A frequent scenario in international commercial
arbitration is that the claimant submits the disputes to arbitration, and the
97 Article V(1)(a) New York Convention 1958.
98 Article V(1)(f) New York Convention.
99 Article V(2)(a) New York Convention.
100 Article V(2)(b) New York Convention.
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defendant then challenges the validity of the arbitration agreement in a
foreign court or in the court of the place of arbitration. The claimant
may then resort to the court of the place of arbitration to declare
the validity of the arbitration agreement. As common occurrences after
the award is delivered, the winning party would be busy identifying the
places of enforcement while the losing party may challenge the award at
the place of arbitration, with an intention to undermine the legality of the
award under Article V(1)(e) and rule out future recognition and enforce-
ment in other jurisdictions with a single blow. Such competing juris-
diction or interference from national courts at different stages of
arbitration will very likely take one back to non-certainty of arbitral
awards and the parallel proceedings the Regulation eagerly wishes to
avoid in national court proceedings.
The likelihood of non-certainty of arbitral awards and parallel proceed-
ings in arbitration is caused by the lack of mutual trust between
arbitration and national courts. Such a lack of trust has already been seen
in various stages of arbitration in case-law. Frequently, court actions are
brought to challenge a tribunal’s jurisdiction and the validity of the
arbitration agreement. It has already been seen as one of the litigation
tactics involving arbitration, as many writers have highlighted.101 In
relation to the relationship between arbitration and national courts,
101 Michael Black and Rupert Reece, ‘Anti-Suit Injunctions and Arbitration
Proceedings’, (2006) 79(3) Arbitration 207; Ben Steinbruck, ‘The Impact of EU
Law on Anti-suit Injunctions in Aid of English Arbitration Proceedings’, (2007)
25 Civil Justice Quarterly 358; Carlyn Lamm, Eckhard Hellbeck and Joseph
Brubaker, ‘Anti-suit Injunctions in Aid of International Arbitration: The Ameri-
can Approach’, (2009) 12 International Arbitration Law Review 115; Christophe
Imhoos, Delphine Rooz and Christophe Seraglini, ‘International Arbitration and
Alternative Dispute Resolution’, (2009) International Business Law Journal 767;
Christa Roodt, ‘Conflicts of Procedure between Courts and Arbitral Tribunals
with Particular Reference to the Right of Access to Court’, (2011) African
Journal of International and Comparative Law 236; David Holloway, note 76
above; John Zadkovich and Nicholas Roberts, ‘West Tankers 2012: Pro-
arbitration through Enforcement of Declaratory Awards’, (2012) 15 International
Arbitration Law Review 51; Hew Dundas, ‘The West Tankers Saga Continues: A
New Twist – Negative Declaratory Awards’, (2012) 85 Arbitration 212; Zheng
Sophia Tang, ‘Parallel Proceedings and Anti-arbitration Injunctions’, (2012) 7
Journal of Business Law 589; Andreas Estrup Ippolito and Morten Adler-Nissen
see note 48 above; Hakeem Seriki, ‘Anti-suit Injunctions and Arbitration:
Parasitic or Free Standing?’, JBL (2013) 3 267; Ugo Draetta, ‘Italy as a Place for
International Arbitrations: The Myths of the “Italian Torpedo”, the “Irritual”
Arbitration et alia’, (2013) International Business Law Journal 159; Mauro
Rubino-Sammartano, note 2 above; Elizabeth Crawford and Janeen Carruthers,
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national courts are said to provide a supporting role before or during
arbitration as well as a supervisory role after arbitral awards are rendered.
Carrying out a supervisory role, national courts are expected to take on
the discretion provided in Article V of the New York Convention and
willingly review any procedural irregularities in arbitration. Such a
supervisory role also implies distrust between arbitration and national
courts. This explains the reason why some arbitral awards are refused
recognition or enforcement by the enforcing courts or are set aside by the
courts of the place of arbitration.
Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Holding Company v the Ministry of
Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan102 is the best example illustrat-
ing such a tangled relationship between parallel proceedings and incon-
sistent decisions between arbitration and national courts. In this case,
Dallah made a proposal to the Pakistani Government to provide housing
for pilgrims on a long term basis. Both parties entered a Memorandum of
Understanding. By virtue of a Promulgated Ordinance, the Awami Hajj
Trust was set up by the Pakistani Government to contract and fund the
project. The Government in the whole contract only played a role as a
guarantor to a financing facility which was to be granted to the Trust by
an affiliate of Dallah. Failing to submit the Ordinance before the
Pakistani Parliament on 19 May 1998, the Trust ceased to exist as a legal
entity in December 1998. Disputes regarding revised payment arose and
the dispute was referred to ICC arbitration against the Government of
Pakistan. However, the tribunal confirmed its jurisdiction over the
Pakistani Government in a partial award dated 21 June 2001. Two further
awards, dated 19 January 2004 and 23 June 2006, saw the tribunal find
the case in Dallah Real Estate’s favour.
Regarding French court proceedings, after the presiding judge of the
Tribunal de Grande Instance de Paris granted Dallah Real Estate an
exequatur of the final award on 24 August 2009, the Government of
Pakistan, Ministry of Religious Affairs filed three applications for annul-
ment of the three respective arbitral awards and sought their annulment
on the basis of Article 1502(1) of the Civil Procedure Code on the
grounds, according to its submissions of 10 November 2010, that the
arbitral tribunal was wrong on the issue of jurisdiction. In the end, a
leave to enforce the final award was obtained by Dallah in August 2009
in France and in October 2009 in England. However, the Pakistani
‘Ferrezpo AG v Gilson Investment Ltd and Ors: A Flexible Interpretation of the
Reflexive Doctrine’, (2013) Edinburgh Law Review 78; C. Van Calster, note 50
above.
102 [2008] EWHC 1901 (Comm), [2009] EWHC Civ 755 (Court of Appeal).
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Government opposed enforcement before the UK courts and commenced
annulment proceedings before the Paris Court of Appeal against all three
awards. Soon after this, a legal tangle unfolded across the English
Channel.
In England, on 1 August 2008, Dallah Real Estate saw its effort to
enforce the award against the Pakistani Government denied by the High
Court on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction. Dallah’s appeal was again
denied by the Court of Appeal on 20 July 2009. On 12 January 2010 the
UK Supreme Court refused Dallah’s request to stay its court proceedings
pending the outcome of the French action to set aside the three awards
brought by the Government before the Paris Court of Appeal. After the
Pakistani Government successfully annulled the awards before the Eng-
lish Courts, on 17 February 2011 the Paris Court of Appeal refused to set
aside the three awards, upholding the arbitral tribunal’s finding that the
Government’s implication was sufficient to justify the extension of the
arbitration agreement; hence, the tribunal’s jurisdiction was properly
established. The Pakistani’ Government’s action to set aside the award
was dismissed.
The issue of distrust between arbitration and national courts can be
frequently demonstrated in the issue of jurisdiction, as Dallah Real
Estate has shown. This case explicitly highlighted the issues of distrust
between arbitration and national courts, inconsistent court judgments and
the English court’s denial of mutual trust and refusal to stay court
proceedings pending the French outcome. What such distrust translates in
arbitration is the effort to ensure the tribunal has the power to determine
its own jurisdiction to avoid litigation tactic under the principle of
competence-competence103 would have to be reviewed by the courts of
103 Article 16(1) of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides: ‘The arbitral
tribunal may rule on its own jurisdiction, including any objections with respect to
the existence or validity of the arbitration agreement. For that purpose, an
arbitration clause which forms part of a contract shall be treated as an agreement
independent of the other terms of the contract. A decision by the arbitral tribunal
that the contract is null and void shall not entail ipso jure the invalidity of the
arbitration clause.’ Also see, Cap. 609 of the Arbitration Ordinance of Hong
Kong, 2011, s.34; J. Delvolvé, J. Rouche and G. Pointon, French Arbitration Law
and Practice (2003) 93; Christopher Brown Ltd. v Genossenschaft Oesterreich-
escher Waldbesitzer [1954] 1 QB 8 [12–13]; Dallah Real Estate and Tourism
Holding Co v The Ministry of Religious Affairs, Government of Pakistan [2010]
UKSC 46 [94] and [97] and Weissfisch v Julius [2006] EWCA Civ 218, [32];
Article 186 of the Swiss Private International Law Act – Chapter 12: Inter-
national Arbitration, 18 December 1987; Article 1697(1) of the Belgian Judicial
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the place of arbitration or the courts of where the unwilling arbitrating
party intends to challenge the same issue in the court proceedings.104
The courts’ power and the decision to review the tribunal’s decision on
its jurisdiction offered by the New York Convention and in Dallah Real
Estate highlighted the distrust in arbitration as a mechanism which is
able to make the correct decisions. The English courts are of the opinion
that the tribunal’s power to determine its own jurisdiction can be
challenged under s. 30(2) of the English Arbitration Act 1996. With
parties’ agreement and the court’s satisfaction of the importance of the
issue of jurisdiction, the courts are given the power to determine any
preliminary points on jurisdiction. Furthermore, the issue of jurisdiction
can still be reviewed by the English court at the challenge stage by means
of s. 67 of the Act. In other words, the court is the ultimate decision
maker in deciding whether the tribunal’s self-determined jurisdiction can
be upheld. Such distrust can be seen in the parallel proceedings between
arbitration and court proceedings as well as at the stages of challenge,
recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards. In short, English courts
view themselves as gatekeepers who have a duty and are empowered to
decide whether an award can score at the enforcement stage. As the UK
Supreme Court stated:
The consistent practice of the courts in England has been that they will
examine or re-examine for themselves the jurisdiction of arbitrators. This can
arise in a variety of contexts, including a challenge to the tribunal’s juris-
diction under section 67 of the 1996 Act, or in an application to stay judicial
proceedings on the ground that the parties have agreed to arbitrate. Thus in
Azov Shipping Co v Baltic Shipping Co [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 68 Rix J
decided that where there was a substantial issue of fact as to whether a party
had entered into an arbitration agreement, then even if there had already been
a full hearing before the arbitrator the court, on a challenge under section 67,
should not be in a worse position than the arbitrator for the purpose of
determining the challenge. This decision has been consistently applied at first
instance (see, e.g., Peterson Farms Inc. v C&M Farming Ltd [2004] EWHC
121 (Comm), [2004] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 603) and is plainly right.105
Code, Sixth Part: Arbitration (Adopted 4 July 1972, amended 27 March 1985 and
19 May 1998) and DTI Departmental Advisory Committee Report Ch III,
pp. 4–5.
104 Caledonian Railway Company v Greenock & Wemyss Bay Railway
Company (1872) 10 M 892; s.30 of the English Arbitration Act 1996, r.19 of the
Scottish Arbitration Rules.
105 Note 103, Dallah Real Estate, [96].
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Such distrust allows the courts to review the tribunal’s decisions in two
ways, as ruled in Dallah; thus: ‘in an international commercial arbitration
a party which objects to the jurisdiction of the tribunal has two options. It
can challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction in the courts of the arbitral seat;
and it can resist enforcement in the court before which the award is
brought for recognition and enforcement.’106 This is because an arbitral
tribunal’s decision as to the existence of its own jurisdiction could not
bind a party who had not submitted the question to the tribunal;
consequently, a party who had not submitted to the tribunal’s jurisdiction
was entitled to a full determination by the court (the English courts in
this case) on an application under annulment or enforcement proceed-
ings.
On the issue of parallel proceedings, during the arbitration proceed-
ings, unless stipulated in the domestic legislation, nothing in the New
York Convention or international agreement prevents parties from initiat-
ing court proceedings to challenge the tribunal’s jurisdiction alongside
the arbitration proceedings. In the case of parallel proceedings between
national courts, it can clearly be seen in Dallah where the Government of
Pakistan was free to raise the annulment proceeding in both England and
France while the enforcement claim was entertained by the English
courts. Similarly, the UK Supreme Court was happy to hear the juris-
diction issue and refused to stay its court proceedings and waited for the
French Cour d’Appel decision. The Court explicitly pointed out that the
English court will only consider staying court proceedings if there is a
valid arbitration agreement between the parties. In the current case, the
Court was of the opinion that no arbitration agreement existed between
the parties because the Government of Pakistan was never privy to the
arbitration agreement. In other words, the tribunal decided the case
without proper jurisdiction. Consequently, the application of stay of court
proceeding pending the result of the French court was dismissed.
The conflicting decisions in Dallah made by both English and French
courts demonstrate that it is highly likely in international arbitration that
an award may have a different fate depending on how the courts of the
seat of arbitration and the enforcing courts view their role in dealing with
arbitration and interpret the issues. Irreconcilable judgments delivered by
both English and French courts can also see different interpretations of
the same jurisdiction issues and principles, which were attributed to the
106 Ibid. [98]. Also see Svenska Petroleum Exploration AB v Government of
the Republic of Lithuania (No 2) [2006] EWCA Civ 1529, [2007] QB 886, para.
104; Paklito Investment Ltd v Klockner East Asia Ltd [1993] 2 HKLR 39, 48
(Kaplan J).
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difference between common law and civil law courts in fact determin-
ation.107 Regardless of the legal basis for conflicting judgments on the
same issue, it has been proven that nothing in the New York Convention
or international agreements would be able to stop parallel proceedings or
conflicting judgments in arbitration.
WHAT IF THE ARBITRATION EXCEPTION WERE
DELETED?
When arbitration and court proceedings meet, tension arises. Such
tension has always been pointed out in matters of anti-suit injunction,
jurisdiction and appointment of arbitrators, recognition and enforcement
of arbitral awards, and inconsistent awards and judgments. Due to
the tension, a call to remove arbitration exception was made during the
consultation of the recast of the Regulation. In accordance with the
Commission’s Green Paper issued in 2009,108 the Commission recognises
the importance of arbitration to international commerce; therefore,
‘[a]rbitration agreements should be given the fullest possible effect and
the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards should be encour-
aged’.109 In seeking answers to the questions of whether strengthening
the effectiveness of arbitration agreements, ensuring a good coordination
between judicial and arbitration proceedings or enhancing the effect-
iveness of arbitration awards should be addressed on the Community
level, the Commission seemed to hold the opinion that arbitration
exemption should be removed from the Regulation to ensure the smooth
circulation of judgments in Europe and prevent parallel proceedings. The
Commission stated:
In particular, a (partial) deletion of the exclusion of arbitration from the scope
of the Regulation might improve the interface of the latter with court
proceedings. As a result of such a deletion, court proceedings in support of
arbitration might come within the scope of the Regulation. A special rule
107 Different approaches in the interpretation of the doctrine of privity of
contract to arbitration agreements were also pointed out as the reason for
conflicting judgments. See Elie Kleiman and Julia Spinelli, ‘Arbitration France’,
http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=11cc3a38-e17b-
47f1-b8f7-cede75cd177b. Accessed 14 August 2013.
108 Green Paper on the review of Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on
Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters of 21.4.2009 (COM(2009) 175 final).
109 Note 108, Section 7, p. 8.
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allocating jurisdiction in such proceedings would enhance legal certainty. For
instance, it has been proposed to grant exclusive jurisdiction for such
proceedings to the courts of the Member State of the place of arbitration,
possibly subject to an agreement between the parties.
Also, the deletion of the arbitration exception might ensure that all the
Regulation’s jurisdiction rules apply for the issuance of provisional measures
in support of arbitration (not only Article 31). Provisional measures ordered
by the courts are important to ensure the effectiveness of arbitration,
particularly until the arbitral tribunal is set up.
Next, a deletion of the exception might allow the recognition of judgments
deciding on the validity of an arbitration agreement and clarify the recog-
nition and enforcement of judgments merging an arbitration award. It might
also ensure the recognition of a judgment setting aside an arbitral award. This
may prevent parallel proceedings between courts and arbitral tribunals where
the agreement is held invalid in one Member State and valid in another.
More generally, the coordination between proceedings concerning the validity
of an arbitration agreement before a court and an arbitral tribunal might be
addressed. One could, for instance, give priority to the courts of the Member
State where the arbitration takes place to decide on the existence, validity, and
scope of an arbitration agreement. This might again be combined with a
strengthened cooperation between the courts seized, including time limits for
the party which contests the validity of the agreement. A uniform conflict rule
concerning the validity of arbitration agreements, connecting, for instance, to
the law of the State of the place of arbitration, might reduce the risk that the
agreement is considered valid in one Member State and invalid in another.
This may enhance, at Community level, the effectiveness of arbitration
agreements compared to Article II(3) New York Convention.
Further, as far as recognition and enforcement is concerned, arbitral awards
which are enforceable under the New York Convention might benefit from a
rule which would allow the refusal of enforcement of a judgment which is
irreconcilable with that arbitral award. An alternative or additional way
forward might be to grant the Member State where an arbitral award was
given exclusive competence to certify the enforceability of the award as well
as its procedural fairness, after which the award would freely circulate in the
Community. Still another solution suggested consists of taking advantage of
Article VII New York Convention to further facilitate at EU level the
recognition of arbitral awards (a question which might also be addressed in a
separate Community instrument).110
Nevertheless, the Commission had a change of heart on the idea of
deletion of arbitration exemption and expressed a much more modest
version of the Proposal to address the interface between arbitration and
110 Note 108, Section 7, p. 9. The copyright of the European Union in the
Green Paper is hereby acknowledged.
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litigation proceedings.111 The Proposal obliges a court seised of a dispute
to stay proceedings if its jurisdiction is contested on the basis of an
arbitration agreement and an arbitral tribunal has been seised of the case
or court proceedings relating to the arbitration agreement have been
commenced in the Member State of the seat of the arbitration. This
modification is said to be able to re-address the relationship between
arbitration and litigation as well as enhance the effectiveness of arbitra-
tion agreements in Europe, prevent parallel court and arbitration proceed-
ings, and eliminate the incentive for abusive litigation tactics.112
However, the final decision to exclude arbitration from the application
of the Regulation means unavoidable delay in arbitration if it is tangled
up with the unplanned court proceedings. As Calster pointed out,
‘[a]rbitration designed for businessmen to avoid the slow delay in the
court proceedings, can become a legal nightmare when it becomes
tangled up with court proceedings. This is especially evident when
arbitrator’s jurisdiction is questioned and parties lodge anti-suit injunc-
tions in the relevant court.’113
HOW WOULD DALLAH REAL ESTATE AND WEST
TANKERS BE INTERPRETED IF THE ARBITRATION
EXEMPTION WERE REMOVED FROM THE
REGULATION?
The above examination illustrates that nothing in the New York Conven-
tion or international agreement would be able to stop parallel proceedings
or conflicting judgments involving arbitration as the Commission would
like to believe. Dallah Real Estate further proved that the judgments
delivered by the English and French courts are in fact in conflict. How
should other signatory countries approach such an issue when both
judgments are presented before the courts? Should they accept the French
or the English judgment based on their obligations imposed by Article I
of the New York Convention? Similarly, the impacts of West Tankers and
the Regulation also demonstrate a very high probability of conflicting
111 Proposal for a Regulation to the Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation
of the European Parliament and the Council on Jurisdiction and Recognition and
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters (Recast) of
14.12.2010 (COM(2010) 748 final).
112 Note 111, s.3.1.4, p. 9.
113 Note 50, 212.
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judgments. As noted by Rubino-Sammartano in his comments on West
Tankers:
Irreconcilable judgments could arise. Entry of judgment produces an outcome
similar in substance to that of an injunction, even if through a very different
mechanism. Perhaps entry of judgment in respect of the arbitral award should
have been stayed pending the Italian judgment. The tanker should really not
have been turned in that way.114
Business persons who place certainty of the result of dispute resolution
high on their agenda when arbitration is chosen as the way to resolve
their dispute understandably would not want to see the awards being
overturned in any way. Both West Tankers and the Regulation sent
arbitration back to the battle-field where lawyers were allowed to drag
the other unwilling parties through court proceedings which were
intended to be excluded by the arbitration agreement. If the first seised
principle had been adopted in both Dallah and West Tankers, as well as
the arbitration exemption being removed from the Regulation, in accord-
ance with lis pendens, Articles 27–30 of the Regulation, the second
seised jurisdiction, though at the potential possibility of inefficiency, the
English court in Dallah and West Tankers would have had to respect the
jurisdiction of the first seised jurisdiction and stay its proceedings. As
arbitration proceedings can still take place under the doctrine of
competence-competence, the removal of the arbitration exemption will
certainly eliminate the possibility of conflicting court judgments which
would put the enforcing court in a dilemma. On the other hand, the
national courts would have to apply mutual trust and believe that other
jurisdictions would have the ability and knowledge to make the correct
decisions as the Commission would like to see.
Although the application of the principle of lis pendens and the
removal of arbitration exemption would avoid inconsistent judgments on
the same issues, the question to be asked is whether West Tankers’s
concern over long delay in the Italian court could become a reality
threatening the efficiency of arbitration. Putting it boldly, the question is
whether the first seised principle in cases involving arbitration should be
replaced by a designated jurisdiction principle such as the court of the
place of arbitration as the suggested Regulations or the enforcing courts.
The arguments in favour of setting the courts of the place of arbitration
as the designated jurisdiction as the first seised jurisdiction can be made
in terms of convenience and reflection of Article V(1)(e) of the New York
114 Note 32, 16.
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Convention. For the sake of convenience, it can be said that the place of
arbitration is the most suitable jurisdiction to provide assistance to the
arbitrating parties since both parties and the tribunal would take part in
the arbitration proceedings at that place. Hence, it would be easier for the
parties to litigate at the place of arbitration if one of the parties questions
the validity of the arbitration agreement or the issue of jurisdiction. This
argument would offer the parties an easy predication of which courts
have jurisdiction as Gasser highlighted,115 as well as hold up to the
application of Article V(1)(e) since the provision allows other signatory
countries to refuse the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award
if it has been set aside by the court where arbitration takes place.
However, such a designation may experience challenge in terms of
parties’ choice of place arbitration. Consequently, it would not only make
the parties re-consider their choice of neutral forum but also educate the
parties to choose a place which has a more efficient court system to avoid
unwanted delay as expressed in West Tankers.
The designated court principle can also be extended to give the
enforcing court the exclusive jurisdiction. This idea can find support in
the delocalisation theory which argues for the idea that control over
arbitral awards should be exercised by the enforcing courts in order to
avoid different restrictions imposed by the local laws. The delocalisation
theory116 is an idea seeking to detach international commercial arbitra-
tions from controls imposed by the law of the place of arbitration (the lex
fori).117 Proponents of the delocalisation theory maintain that inter-
national commercial arbitration should not be subject to legal controls
115 Gasser, para. 72.
116 J. Paulsson, ‘Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of Its
Country of Origin’, (1981) 30 I.C.L.Q. 358. J. Paulsson, ‘Delocalisation of
International Commercial Arbitration: When and Why It Matters’ (1983) 32
I.C.L.Q. 53. G. Bernini, ‘The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards by
National Judiciaries: A Trail of the New York Convention’s Ambit and Work-
ability in The Art of Arbitration’ (Liber Amicorum for Pieter Sanders (ed.))
(1982), 50, 58; P. Lalive, ‘Les regles de conflict de lois appliquees au fond litige
par l’arbitre international siegeant en Suisse’, Rev. Arb. (1976), 155, 159.
117 Accordingly, the delocalisation theory can be applied at two stages of the
arbitration procedure. One is delocalising the arbitral procedure from the controls
of the lex fori. The other is delocalising arbitral awards. Delocalising the arbitral
procedure refers to removing the supervisory authority of the lex fori and the
local courts where the arbitration is held. As far as delocalised arbitral awards are
concerned, it means removing the power of the courts at the place of arbitration
to make an internationally effective declaration of the award’s nullity. See J.
Paulsson, ‘The Extent of Independence of International Arbitration from the Law
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which vary from country to country. In particular, the controls may not
suit the fast development and practice of international commercial
arbitration. With an intention to eliminate the compulsory controls of the
lex fori, they maintain that the control mechanism should be exercised by
the country where the recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards is
sought. They believe that the development of international commercial
arbitration can be impeded because of the different restraints imposed on
the arbitration procedure by the different national courts, since arbitrators
not only have to be aware of more than one national law but also have to
juggle with the different restraints imposed by different laws.118 , In their
opinion the best way to eliminate these potential obstacles is to free the
arbitration procedure from the control of the place of arbitration and
designate the review power to the enforcing courts. Thus, they argue, the
arbitration procedure should be ‘delocalised’ and completely freed from
the mandatory rules and public policy of the place of arbitration. In
accordance with this theory, the arbitrators do not need to look over their
shoulders at the different national mandatory rules and public policy
imposed by the laws of the place of arbitration, the place making the
contract, the place of performance, the place of enforcement, and so on.
One of their arguments is based on the difference between arbitrators and
judges sitting in national courts. Observing the different nature of a
national court’s judge from a private arbitrator, they claim that arbitrators
are under no duty to apply the lex fori to the arbitration. As Paulsson
said:
The international arbitrator is in a fundamentally different position. Whatever
one might think of the contractual source of an arbitral tribunal’s authority as
a purely internal matter, it is difficult to consider the international arbitrator as
a manifestation of the power of a State. His mission, conferred by the parties’
consent, is one of a private nature, and it would be a rather artificial
interpretation to deem his power to be derived, and very indirectly at that,
from a tolerance of the State of the place of arbitration.119
Following the suggestion that arbitrators do not have to follow the lex
fori, it is therefore unnecessary for them to consider the mandatory rules
of the lex fori when they deal with an international commercial dispute.
of the Situs’, in J. Lew (ed.), Contemporary Problems in International Arbitra-
tion (1986), Kluwer, 141.
118 W. Park, ‘National Law and Commercial Justice: Safeguarding Procedural
Integrity in International Arbitration’, (1989) 63 Tul. L.R. 647, 667.
119 Note 116, J. Paulsson, ‘Arbitration Unbound: Award Detached from the
Law of Its Country of Origin’ (1981) 30 I.C.L.Q. 358, 362.
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As a result, they recommend that the supervisory powers should only be
exercised by the courts where the recognition or enforcement is sought.
Nevertheless, the purpose of this theory is not to try to escape from the
national court’s control, as Paulsson states: ‘To seek completely to avoid
national jurisdictions would be misguided. Indeed, the international
arbitral system would ultimately break down if no national jurisdiction
could be called upon to recognise and enforce awards.’120 Furthermore,
‘the delocalised award is not thought to be independent of any legal
order. Rather the point is that a delocalised award may be accepted by the
legal order of an enforcement jurisdiction although it is independent from
the legal order of its country of origin.’121
However, the problem with the argument for designating the enforcing
court as the first seised jurisdiction is the uncertainty of the place of
enforcement. In reality, the losing party may not be in a position to
predict where the enforcement claim will be lodged unless all his assets
are located within one jurisdiction. Consequently, it was criticised as a
fallacy to place the enforcing court as the designating court. However,
with the application of the New York Convention not affected by the
Regulation,122 the Commission’s opinion in applying the lesser
restrictions concerning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral
awards to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the enforcing
country under Article VII of the New York Convention would ensure the
enforceability of arbitral awards to the extent allowed by the enforcing
courts. Making the enforcing court the designated court also corresponds
with Article 5 of the Hypothetical Draft Convention on the International
Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Awards,123 which invokes
the removal of the place of arbitration from the equation of recognition
and enforcement, across all jurisdictions. Although only a handful
of jurisdictions have allowed such a practice, such as France,124
120 Note 116, Paulsson, ‘Delocalisation of International Arbitration: When
and Why It Matters’, (1983) 32 I.C.L.Q. 53, 54.
121 Ibid.
122 Article 73(2) of the Regulation.
123 Albert Jan van den Berg, Hypothetical Draft Convention on the Inter-
national Enforcement of Arbitration Agreements and Awards,; http://www.
arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12133674097980/hypothetical_draft_convention_aj
brev06.pdf. Accessed 24 September 2014.
124 Chapter III, French Decree No. 2011-48 of 13 January 2011. Also see
Société Hilmarton Ltd v Société OTV (Cour de cassation, 2 March 1994) YB
Comm Arb, XX (1995) 66; Chromalloy Aeroservices Inc. v Ministry of Defence
of the Republic of Egypt 939 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C.1996); Société PT Putrabali
Adyamulia v Société Rena Holding et Société Mnogutia Est Epices (2007) Revue
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Belgium125 and Switzerland,126 the real difficulty in designating the
enforcing court lies in the limited acceptance of delocalisation theory
among most jurisdictions. Under these circumstances, the results of
arbitration and all proceedings related to arbitration are being left to the
mercy of individual national courts. This would never be the parties’
intention when they first choose arbitration to resolve disputes. To make
matters worse, parties are indirectly told by West Tankers and the
Regulation that they can race to courts to seek the declaration of the
validity of arbitration agreements.
A RACE TO COURT?
The relationship between court and arbitration proceedings has often
been described as a partnership. Due to lack of coercive powers invested
in the tribunal, smooth arbitration proceedings can only be ensured with
the full support of national courts. However, as with any good relation-
ship, the balance between court and arbitration needs to be addressed
carefully to avoid unnecessary negative competition between the two.127
With the European Court’s judgment on West Tankers and the promul-
gation of the Regulation, the old practice of parallel proceedings and
conflicting judgments within the European courts has come to a stop. The
Regulation may manage to achieve coordination between national courts
of the Member States; however, the maintaining of arbitration exemption
in Article 1(2)(d) could not be said to have done the same for arbitration
and its relationship with court proceedings as highlighted above. The
exclusion of arbitration from the scope of application of the Regulation
expressly rules out the application of lis pendens principles in any
European court proceedings dealing with arbitration issues, especially the
issue of jurisdiction. Now, what one would see is arbitrating parties’ race
to court caused by the Commission’s refusal to remove arbitration
de l’Arbitrage 507, English translation in Bertrand Derains and Yves Derains, 29
June 2007 Cour de cassation – Première chambre civile Cour de cassation –
Première chambre civile 29 June 2007, available at http://www.kluwer
arbitration.com/document.aspx?id=ipn80892&query=content%3A%22putrabali
%22. Accessed 14 August 2013.
125 Judicial Code, Sixth Part: Arbitration (adopted 4 July 1972 and last
amended on 19 May 1998).
126 Article 192 of the Swiss Private International Law Act 1987.
127 Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk
Hydropower Plant LLP [2013] UKSC 35.
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exclusion from the application of the Regulation. Consequently, a race to
court has started for the parties who wish to challenge the tribunal’s
jurisdiction and the validity of arbitration agreements. By pushing
arbitration out of the scope of the Regulation, the potential possibility of
parties being stuck in less efficient court proceedings was under-
estimated by the Commission. Holding the principle of competence-
competence high in defending the decision to exclude arbitration, the
Commission pointed out that arbitration proceedings would not be
delayed because tribunals have the power to determine jurisdiction and
make awards. Nevertheless, rulings by English courts in cases such as
Christopher Brown Ltd. v Genossenschaft Oesterreichescher Wald-
besitzer128 and Dallah129 have indicated that a tribunal’s ruling on its own
jurisdiction is only the first step, and such a step is subject to the final
decision of the English courts. These reflect a long-established practice
adopted by most jurisdictions within or beyond Europe.130
Considering the international nature of commercial arbitration, the
impact of anti-suit injunction practice in non-European jurisdictions is
also worth mentioning. While the English courts are no longer allowed to
tell other European courts not to interfere with cases involving arbitra-
tion, the English courts are consistently willing to order anti-suit injunc-
tions to interfere in foreign proceedings outside of Europe. This can be
observed in the recent case of Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant
JSC v AES Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower131 involving Kazakhstan and
England respectively. In an action for disclosure of information in the
Kazakh court, the appellant’s application to stay court proceedings on the
basis of arbitration agreement and an anti-suit injunction order given by
the English courts was dismissed. The Kazakh court expressly pointed
out that, though the appellant was successful in obtaining an interim
measure, later made final, from the English court, nevertheless the
Kazakh court was under no obligation to recognise the injunction and
stay the proceedings as requested. The Kazakh court was of the opinion
that it was free to declare the invalidity of the arbitration agreement in
the Concession agreement.132
128 [1954] 1 QB 8.
129 Dallah, para. 97 and Weissfisch v Julius [2006] EWCA Civ 218, [2006] 1
Lloyd’s Rep 716, [32].
130 Ch III, pp. 4–5, DTI Departmental Advisory Committee Report on draft
Arbitration Bill (February 1994).
131 [2013] UKSC 35.
132 [2013] UKSC 35 [12].
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While the interim injunction issued by the English court failed to
prevent the parallel proceedings, and ultimately was ignored by the
Kazakh court, the English Court of Appeal133 also refused to take the
Kazakh court’s judgment into consideration and proceeded to declare that
the English courts were not bound by the Kazakh court’s ruling as the
grounds relied upon by the Kazakh court were unsustainable under
English law.134 This decision was later confirmed by the Supreme Court,
which ruled that the power allowing courts to grant injunctions in Section
37 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 should be exercised sensitively and
with due regard to the principles underpinning the Arbitration Act 1996,
but under the circumstances of the present case, it was reasonable for the
English court to intervene in foreign court proceedings.135
Similar to the high possibility of irreconcilable judgments caused by
the arbitration exemption in the Regulation, conflicting judgments have
been seen in arbitration practice involving non-European jurisdictions.
When Seriki136 criticised the English courts’ willingness to injunct the
party and non-EU court proceedings in order to ‘uphold the sanctity of
arbitration agreement’,137 it is essential to recognise that such a willing-
ness is not restricted to English courts but also courts of most juris-
dictions, as seen in Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower Plant JSC v AES
Ust-Kamenogorsk Hydropower.138
CONCLUSION
This examination has clearly demonstrated that the practice of granting
anti-suit injunction is not just a European issue but also an international
issue. Consequently, the level of consideration on how to address such an
issue has to be raised to international level. Unfortunately, instead of
addressing the culture of race to court litigation on a European level, in
the hope of being followed by other jurisdictions, the Commission
actually passively encourages such practice by refusing to remove the
arbitration exclusion. Consequently, no good balance between arbitration
and court proceedings is achieved on either a European or an inter-
national level. The parties’ wishes to use arbitration as the means of
133 [2011] EWCA Civ 647.
134 [2013] UKSC 35, [10].
135 [61].
136 Hakeem Seriki, note 102.
137 Ibid.
138 [2013] UKSC 35.
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dispute resolution have been left to the mercy of relevant national courts
which adopt different approaches such as localisation or delocalisation.
While both approaches have been criticised for undesirable interference
and failing to reflect the reality of the practice, raising the discussion to
the international level may allow the consideration of the new proposed
approaches of designated first seised jurisdiction, either the place of
arbitration or the enforcing court alongside the Hypothetical Draft
Convention to provide a better balance between arbitration and court
proceedings, and further address parties’ intention and needs in their
choice of arbitration as the method of dispute resolution.
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